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The Independent Counsel Act
transcribedremarks of
THE HONORABLE KENNETH W. STARR*
By virtue of three snow storms and the shoveling of an enormous
quantity of snow, I am before you mindful of Rory [Little]'s
suggestion that we are here to find our voice, and I am very much in
search of a voice. If this raspy voice will hold up, I want not only to
express thanks to the wonderful people who put this symposium
together, but to Rory for being such a wonderful and gracious host.
My comments this morning are addressed to Watergate's wake,
aptly characterized by Suzanne Garment in her simply-entitled book,
Scandal, as "The Culture of Mistrust in American Politics." As we
who lived through Watergate know, that culture found expression in
a variety of initiatives in Congress immediately following the firing of
Professor Cox, and culminated, of course, several years later in the
Independent Counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act.
What is illuminating in reflecting on that earlier period of
Congressional activity stimulated by the firing-the Saturday Night
Massacre-was the proliferation of bills directed quite specifically at
public integrity investigations of high-level officials. This had become
for Congress an extraordinarily high matter of great moment. As
recounted by Terry Eastland in his informative book, Ethics, Politics
and the Independent Counsel, no fewer than eight separate bills were
introduced in the fall of 1973 alone. More were to come.
Their approach in that initial phase varied. Some called for
presidential appointment subject to Senate confirmation, as in Teapot
Dome, but others proposed-for the first time in our nation's
history-the power to appoint and to remove a special prosecutor
being vested in the federal judiciary. This was another dimension of
what Reid [Weingarten] referred to as Watergate's creation of a
"volcano of change."
And this, it seems to me, spawned one of Watergate's lessobserved but truly baleful effects: embroiling the federal judiciary,
previously neutral, at least in theory and almost always in practice-
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in the ever-constant two-branch warfare between the Congress and
the Executive. That is the nature of our system. But the Judiciary
found itself embroiled in the politics of ethics, forcing upon the
federal judiciary an operational role that tugged at the integrity and
purity of the Article III function. Historically, the Judiciary's role in
such matters was quite limited in form by a common sense
operational rule of necessity, such as appointing interim United States
Attorneys until the President, typically an incoming President, could
select a permanent replacement. But the President enjoyed absolute
power to remove any such interim United States Attorney.
The point is that the practice on the part of the federal judiciary
in our history tended to be entirely ministerial, nonpolitical and quite
uncontroversial as the judges would invariably elevate, temporarily,
the First Assistant in the office or another senior career prosecutor.
But these post-Watergate initiatives represented an entirely different,
very visible, and inevitably divisive and controversial task being thrust
upon an unwelcoming judiciary.
It should be said that this role was seen as anathema by
thoughtful and experienced federal judges. One great judge with
whom I was privileged to serve, Gerhard Gesell-may he rest in
peace-lamented in the judicial literature that the idea of a court
appointment of a special prosecutor was (and he understated this)
"most unfortunate." These lamentations were seconded by none
other than the soon-to-be-legendary Chief Judge in Washington, John
Sirica. He wrote the Senate Judiciary Chairman that eight-that was
virtually all-of his fellow judges shared his sense of hearty
disapprobation: "Keep the judges out of the pig sty."
Congress was, of course, of an entirely different mind. The
burden of Watergate-and in particular, the Saturday Night
Massacre-was too heavy to bear. Independence of the prosecutor
became the familiar watchword, even more intensely than had been
the case during the difficult confirmation process of Elliot
Richardson-may he rest in peace-when, as the Attorney Generaldesignate, he announced the well-received appointment of Archibald
Cox. In that very difficult time, and in that troubling colloquy with
the Senate, Mr. Richardson stood firm on what he viewed as bedrock
constitutional principle, that the Executive could, in the exercise of its
discretion, appoint an outsider, a special prosecutor. This had been
done for well over a century at the time, going back to the rather
untidy administration of Ulysses S. Grant. But it was the Executive's
prerogative, for the exercise of which it would and should be held
accountable. And so too, in Mr. Richardson's view, final authority
had to remain in the Attorney General himself or herself, or
elsewhere within the Executive, but it could not be stripped from the
President.
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Congress was likewise unmoved by powerful submissions of
Edward Levi, a renowned scholar, who was occupying with great
dignity the post of Attorney General. He urged Congress not to do it.
The protest of the distinguished former federal judge, Harold Tyler,
as Deputy Attorney General about the inappropriate erosion of
Separation of Powers principles was simply turned aside by
Democrats and Republicans alike. In short, Congress deliberately,
knowingly, aggressively, and after due notice, intruded into territory
that had historically been viewed as belonging to the President and
the Executive Branch more generally, and in the process, ordered the
federal judiciary, through a newly created special division, to march in
as well to this politically-charged zone.
Now, it may be said by the constitutional lawyers and scholars
here that these self-interested plaintive views were misguided
lamentations, as revealed by the ringing seven-to-one decision in
Morrison v. Olson, upholding the statute's constitutionality against
exactly, or in the face of exactly, these kinds of submissions. Far be it
from me to suggest that the Supreme Court could somehow have
been wrong, and that Justice Scalia's lone voice in dissent-in a
masterful piece of judicial literature-could somehow have gotten it
right. We know full well, as the late Robert Jackson taught us, that
the Supreme Court is not final because it is infallible-to the
contrary, it is infallible because it is final, and that is it. And the
Court, let's not be too petty, has shown a muscular willingness to
defend bedrock structural principles as it sees them in our
constitutional framework; as we see in the arresting decisions
marching under the banner of federalism. Sara [Sun Beale] referred
to, at least obliquely, the VAWA case now pending. But the Court
has not, more pertinently, been shy about enforcing Separation of
Powers principles, and we can glean this from a very quick review of a
number of decisions (including some quite recent). And so Morrison
stands, and Congress was thus allowed, in the late 1980s, to continue
the post-Watergate experiment under the Ethics in Government Act
for another-count them-eleven years. And Reid tells us there's
more to come.
So let me turn rather-in anticipation of some future misguided
Congress suggesting that we resurrect such a mechanism-to the
policy embodied in the Statute and assume that the Supreme Court
knew what it was doing in Morrison. I will thus set aside the rich
questions of constitutional legitimacy.
The value at stake was that which Elliot Richardson spoke of,
independence, but that was the foundational principle. Others were
at play, and Reid suggested some of them. And it is these, call them
"subsidiary," principles, that eventually led the Congress at a policy
level to say, "Enough. The twenty-one year experiment born of
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Watergate is ended."
The first sub-principle was specialization of focus. Reid
lamented this-or at least I took it, Reid, as a lamentation-and when
you said those investigations are different, I took that not to be a
compliment. An Independent Counsel will be given (this was
Congress' design) a particular charge, set forth in writing as to a
particular identified individual, and possibly (as we saw in what my
family and I refer to as "the recent unpleasantness"), the rather openended category of "others." Now that is unusual, but it's obviously
not unknown in prosecutorial history; it has been suggested over our
history that different persons have been the subject of a careful
prosecutorial focus, say, Al Capone. But that prosecutorial focus
represents at its best an ultimate judgment born of facts, of
experience, of information, of a body of evidence, possibly of prior
grand jury investigations, guiding an existing prosecutorial office
which may even be subject to the kinds of accountability that Judge
Jensen just reminded us of. And for that office to husband its
resources and dedicate time and energy to a particular investigation, a
sort of prosecutorial counterpart to the FBI's Ten Most Wanted.
Now it may be that, in assessing the state of law enforcement, the
officer in charge-be that the Office of the Attorney General, or Jim
Robinson when he was U.S. Attorney, or Lowell Jensen in his
capacity as District Attorney-will say, "My top priority in this
administration or in this office is public integrity investigations," and
proceed accordingly, including quite narrowly and specifically and in
a targeted manner.
And so where is the difference? The Independent Counsel
statute upon study will be seen, I believe, as a horse of an entirely
different color. There, individuals only in the Executive Branch are,
in effect, put on a Most Closely Watched list. One becomes a suspect
as a matter of law. Let's call it Congress' Megan's law. And then
whenever triggering information is brought to the Attorney General
about these Executive Branch actors, the Attorney General must
seek the appointment by three federal judges of an Independent
Counsel who will then at some cost start up a brand new office from
scratch. Economies of scale were completely ignored by Congress.
But once appointed, his or her duties as Independent Counsel are not
only to investigate and possibly bring prosecutions; the Independent
Counsel must give an account in a final report of the work of the
office. This was unique. Congress hadn't previously required this.
But, it did here.
By tradition, prosecutors make decisions, and they either go to
court with indictments or they close the case and they move on. It
should come as no surprise that individuals named in various reports
filed over the history of the law, even with the statutory right to reply,
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have viewed the prosecutor's report, the Independent Counsel's
report, as profoundly unfair and horribly damaging to their
Most remarkably, Congress saw fit to give an
reputations.
Independent Counsel-unprotected by the rest of the Executive
Branch, which enjoys incentives to stand in the way of an
Independent Counsel-the responsibility of producing a referral to
Congress on the possible impeachment of a sitting President.
Now, that is truly an unprecedented job description, and we of
course have lived once-and I believe, Reid, that we will only live
once-through that process of an inferior officer being called upon to
undertake that kind of task. Now, lawyers well know, and law
students do as well, that there are two sides to every case, or virtually
every case-judges certainly feel that way, and so too here. Let's not
be too monochromatic. Congress clearly intended for almost a
generation for allegations of potential wrongdoing to be given the
most searching exacting scrutiny. No cover-ups, get to the bottom of
the matter.
After all, sad to say the Justice Department itself was
compromised during Watergate. We've been talking about Mr.
Dean's eloquent comments, and about White House officials and
asterisks representing lawyers in the White House. But that list also
undoubtedly included senior officials of my beloved Justice
Department. The Department was compromised in a profound way,
and moreover, since public integrity cases are inherently sensitive and
controversial, even an honest Justice Department might not be
especially energetic or vigilant. The concern is obvious on Congress'
part. The attitude within the Department might be, "Why rock the
boat? Someone-maybe someone very important-will get angry.
They'll call the prosecutor some very unpleasant names, and it will
otherwise be rather unpleasant to walk around town." And of course
these are, as Professor Beale has reminded us, cases that involve
statutes that typically involve illusive questions of intent, and a good
prosecutor can always find some imperfection, some blemish. So, if
it's not cold on the docks, let it go, don't bring it. As every informed
observer and participant in the criminal justice system knows,
potential cases, even relatively strong cases, can be killed, and
reasonable minds obviously can always differ. But it may also be, as
one federal judge put it, in describing the attitude of the United
States Attorney's office in that particular jurisdiction (a jurisdiction
that is not in California, I hasten to note), "The United States
Attorney's office here doesn't go chasing after important people."
Congress wanted Executive Branch public integrity cases, or
possible federal criminal wrongdoing more generally, to have a
remarkable priority. That's a policy choice, but it's not an inevitable
choice (it's certainly not a necessary choice), it's simply a choice that
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Congress made after Watergate. And it was a choice that, in my
judgement, threatened the Founders' structure embodied in balanced
government. That is, the Independent Counsel statute, as I testified
before Senator Thompson's committee, undid the balance. Even
though honest men and women of ability-leaving present company
aside, other than Reid-were called upon to take this responsibility
and worked diligently at it, the structural imbalance became, with the
searing light of two controversial investigations of sitting Presidents,
increasingly evident.
And so my own solace is two-fold. First, I was privileged in my
own experience as Independent Counsel to serve with men and
women mostly from the Justice Department and the United States
Attorney's Offices, with the excellent support of Jim Robinson and
the able men and women of his division-men and women of high
ability and of character who labored under at times very difficult
circumstances. And my second source of solace is that it was my
privilege to advise Attorney General William French Smith, under
whom both Lowell and I served back in the 1980s, to oppose the
reauthorization of the statute at that time. Bill Smith-may he rest in
peace---did not need my advice. That was carrying coals to
Newcastle. He urged Congress in the strongest terms, as did his
successors, until recently, to allow the statute to expire on grounds of
law and policy and our beloved Constitution.
I leave you with this pre-luncheon query. Would history, both in
the 1980s and more recently, have been different if Congress had seen
fit in 1982 and 1983 to follow William French Smith's advice?

